Despite the prominence of corruption in the European Commission’s assessment of the Candidate countries from the late nineties onwards, concerns have been raised that the European Commission’s approach was not systematic enough. In particular, there was a lack of objective anti-corruption conditions and a resulting perception that countries were not treated equally – with some obliged to meet tougher criteria than others. In its 2002 report, Monitoring the Accession Process: Corruption and Anti-corruption Policy, the OSI’s project, EUMAP – Monitoring the Access Process - noted:

“Despite the suggestive nature of the Copenhagen Criteria regarding corruption, neither the reasons for including corruption as an accession issue nor the exact criteria candidate States must fulfil in terms of anti-corruption policy or levels of corruption have been spelled out by the Commission in detail.”

Since the adoption by the EU of the document “On a Comprehensive EU Policy against Corruption”, which includes a stocktaking exercise of the Communities’ fight against corruption and suggestions for the way forward, and European Commissioner for Administration, Audit and Anti-fraud, Siim Kallas’s, European Transparency Initiative, the EU’s own anti-corruption standards have substantially improved. However, the issues of implementation of new measures in Member States and disparity between standards in the EU and those imposed on Candidate countries remain.

When negotiations between the countries and the European Commission begin, specific steps to be taken in order to ensure compliance with Accession criteria are decided upon. It is here that specific anti-corruption measures should be outlined.

Critique of anti-corruption policy in the first round of Eastern Enlargement can be used to extrapolate lessons learned to be applied in future Enlargements. This is set out in section VII below. In addition, the EU Accession process can be viewed as a development assistance programme with a strong element of conditionality, thus assessment of its strengths and weaknesses can also be instructive in the design of development policies more generally.

It is crucially important that the EU’s own anti-corruption standards are high. First the EU may be accused of double standards, which undercuts its attempt to promote democratic values, including good governance, beyond its borders.

Second, and perhaps most importantly, if standards are lower in EU member states than those demanded of candidate countries, there is a real danger that standards will fall when a country becomes a member of the Union. Arguably this is already happening. Potentially this will undermine the credibility of the Accession process and its conditionality if it is known that once a country has acceded the need to conform to rigorous anti-corruption standards is removed. Accession countries will pay lip-service to anti-corruption standards with no intention of implementing them fully over the longer term. There are parallels with other areas covered by the Copenhagen Criteria where the EU’s own standards are significantly lower than those applied in Accession, such as minority rights protection. It is particularly problematic in the case of anti-corruption because it can take many years of committed implementation and rigorous monitoring before reforms bear fruit. If anti-corruption policy is indispensable in a democracy, then logically EU countries should also incorporate it in their political systems.

Related issues include transparency in the use of EU funds, which the ETI examines. Currently the end beneficiaries of the €80 billion spent by the EU in shared management schemes (amounting to 76 per cent of its entire budget), including agricultural support and structural funds, remain largely obscured to the public. The right to disclose the identities of the beneficiary organisations lies in the hands of the EU’s member states. Though member states manage the funds and their final distribution, ultimate budgetary responsibility remains with the Commission.

The report “On a Comprehensive EU Policy against Corruption” shows a European Commission increasingly concerned with corruption. This is positive however certain aspects may weaken the Union’s capacity to put changes into effect:

First, the EU deliberately only works directly with the aspects of anti-corruption that are not covered by the other international institutions, notably the UN, Council of Europe and the OECD. This is a useful approach to avoid duplication of efforts, but limits the EU’s room for independent manoeuvre.

Second, the Accession process is still mainly about implementing the Acquis Communautaires i.e. making all national legislation compatible with that of the EU. While anti-corruption legislation is part of the Acquis the EU’s remit only covers areas where Member States have transferred sovereignty. These include many matters related to corruption, like criminal law, judicial cooperation, money laundering trade policy, procurement rules, accounting standards etc. However, other relevant areas remain within Member States’ competence and hence cannot be included in the Accession process.

The European Commission, which is leading the negotiations on behalf of the EU, has interpreted this flexibly and has required tangible results that arguably breach its mandate, including the ratification of the relevant OECD and Council of Europe Conventions. However, as this is not a requirement for the old Member States, the Commission is in danger of being accused of applying different standards to the new and the old EU countries.

Third, the Commission lacks a monitoring system for member state compliance with anti-corruption legislation. The EU is lagging behind both the OECD and Council of Europe in this area, though the Commission is currently working to find a solution.

Finally, Accession itself can also generate new corruption risks in Candidate countries, for example in the distribution of the funds flowing in (the same applies in Member States). This in turn hinders economic development and contributes to public resentment and to underlying political and economic instability. Abuse in the disbursement of EU funds occurs for many reasons: weak control mechanisms in candidate countries; existing structures of corruption; limited capacity to absorb funds; inadequate financial oversight by EU bodies; and lack of civil society involvement in monitoring the use of funds.