Eastern Enlargement was conceived of as a project beneficial to both the EU and the Candidate countries alike. Critics have highlighted the benefits to the European Union of securing access to new markets in Eastern Europe (especially at a time when economic growth in many Member States has stalled) and of generating stability and growth (and thus stemming immigration into the EU) in the post-Communist countries.

However many individuals within the European institutions and the governments that framed the Accession process, as well as contemporary leaders, view Enlargement, at least in part, as a vehicle for the promotion of reform in post-Communist Europe, the ultimate beneficiaries of which should be the citizens of the Candidate countries. Corruption is a significant barrier to realisation of this vision of Enlargement.

If corruption continues to accompany the Accession process, only a minority of the population will benefit from reforms. Thus Enlargement will be viewed as an elite project which only benefits a few; this carries the risk of backlash against European integration – arguably one of the reasons for low support for EU membership in new Member States and Candidate Countries, and nationalist reactions among sections of the population.

Support to the membership of the European Union – % EU

red: candidate Countries
yellow: new EU member states
blue: old EU member states

Source: Standard Eurobarometer 63 – Public opinion in the European Union (May - June 2005). European Commission.

The European institutions should be alarmed about hostility towards European integration in new Member States and Candidate countries since this feeling could reinforce anti-European sentiment and contribute to the legitimacy crisis that the EU faces.

The rejections of the EU Constitution by voters in the Netherlands and France have been interpreted as opposition to Eastern Enlargement (it should be noted that there is no conclusive evidence that this is the case; domestic concerns were also prominent in both countries). If this interpretation is accepted, however, then effective anti-corruption reform could help allay EU voter fears and thus temper so-called “Enlargement fatigue”.

Simply put, continued prevalence of corruption undermines reform efforts in the Candidate countries, limiting democratic consolidation and economic development. This has a detrimental effect on conditions in the countries and poses risks for the EU.

The Copenhagen Criteria for membership of the EU encompass political, economic, and legal/technical areas as follows:

• Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
• The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
• The ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic & monetary union.

These criteria were decided upon at the European Summit held in Copenhagen in June 1993.

Corruption is most commonly discussed in association with the political criteria which cover rule of law, including effective functioning of public administration, police, judiciary, and local government, democratic consolidation, and broader institutional reform. Widespread corruption prevents state institutions and agencies from acting in the public interest, a key aspect of democratic consolidation.

The argument for mainstreaming anti-corruption lies in the fact that corruption strongly relates to economic and legal criteria too.

Anti-corruption reforms are necessary to meet the economic criteria of a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with the competitive pressures of membership of the single market. High prevalence of corruption in the private sector hinders the functioning of the market economy through loss of resources and biased outcomes in favour of corrupt businesses. The phenomenon of state capture, the power of corrupt networks involving politicians, business people, and organised crime, has been identified frequently as a feature of political systems in post-Communist Europe.

Corruption also detracts from a country’s ability to meet the third criterion, adoption of the body of EC law, the Acquis Communautaires, because it limits the competence of the government, and its capacity to enact, implement and enforce legislation. This relates back to the political criteria, since rule of law and establishing democratic institutions improves a country’s capacity to implement legislative reforms.

For the EU, substantial risks are attached to granting membership to countries with perceived high levels of corruption, including:

• potential misuse of EU funds
• distortion of the internal market
• increased non-compliance with EC law
• policy-making beholden to vested interests.

In each case, a comprehensive approach is likely to be more effective than “adding on” corruption. This will also complement internal EU reform processes, such as the European Transparency Initiative.